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GLOBAL FORCES OF CORPORATE CHANGE AND 
EUROPEAN PATH-DEPENDENCIES: A REVIEW OF 
AFTER ENRON (MCCAHERY/ARMOUR EDS.) 
 
Peer Zumbansen* 
 
Joseph A. McCahery and John Armour, eds. After Enron: Improving 
Corporate Law and Modernising Securities Regulation in Europe and the US 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006) ISBN 978-1841135311 hc, 1-84113-531-3 pb. 
 
 
I. 
 
Edited academic collections on topics that by their mere name-mentioning 
alone have entered the public consciousness well beyond scholarly circles, 
constitute a risk for the editors, the authors and the publishers. In a fast-
evolving world of academic publishing with a constant increase in paper-
based and online venues of disseminating expert knowledge, the status of 
a carefully edited volume of substantive content and length remains 
ambiguous. This explains why many pieces included in a volume like the 
one here under review will have previously appeared in academic journals 
or, often, as working papers on the omnipresent Social Sciences Research 
Network.1 Why then take on in this volume the task – as editor and, 
indeed, as publisher – of assembling previously published articles and of 
soliciting further original work from some of the most renowned experts? 
 
While such general observations might be prompted by the appearance of 
the 700 page volume that convenes some of the leading scholars in the 
field of US and European corporate law with a focus on the assessment of 
the 2000 crash of “Wall Street’s darling”, the Enron corporation, any such 
                                                 
*  Professor and Associate Dean (Research), Osgoode Hall Law School, York 
University, Toronto. Director, CLPE Comparative Research in Law & Political 
Economy. www.comparativeresearch.net. Email: 
Pzumbansen@osgoode.yorku.ca 
1  See: http://ssrn.com. 
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doubts over the need for this publications are quickly brushed aside once 
the volume is opened.  
 
After Enron presents an excellent and timely collection of observations of 
the Enron debacle, provided by some of the most astute and informed 
scholars, and masterfully integrated by two of the finest academics in this 
field. The editors, Dr John Armour, originally of the Faculty of Law at the 
University of Cambridge and Member of the Cambridge Centre for 
Business Research, since 1 July 2007 the Lovells Professor of Law and 
Finance, and Professor Joseph McCahery, formerly at the University of 
Tilburg, now of the University of Amsterdam, have succeeded in 
collecting, conceptualizing and organizing a most comprehensive and 
intriguing collection of excellent writings on Enron and its aftermath. 
Their book can aptly serve for a first-blush as for a more in-depth analysis 
of the problems, whether in research or in teaching of company law 
courses. Yet, beyond this achievement, the editors are also importantly 
contributing to a debate, which has for some time now emphasized the 
need to take a deliberately comparative viewpoint when analyzing the 
trajectories of corporate law development around the world.2 This debate 
has only more recently begun to explore the existing differences in greater 
depth and with view to the historical, political and socio-economical 
context of company law regulation.3 This move to a “deeper reading” of 
the contextual conditions of the regulatory framework of companies’ 
activities in advanced4 and developing nations5 is unlikely to be reversed 
in the near future, given the growing awareness that company law rules – 
like many other legal regimes – form part of a complex regulatory 
environment, which is historically grown and continues to develop along 
co-evolutionary lines of official/unofficial, hard/soft law legislation, and 
                                                 
2  Jeffrey N. Gordon/Mark J. Roe (Ed.), Convergence and Persistence in Corporate 
Governance, 2004). 
3  See the contributions in Klaus J. Hopt/Eddy Wymeersch/Hideki Kanda/Harald 
Baum (Ed.), Corporate Governance in Context. Corporations, States and 
Markets in Europe, Japan and the US, 2005); a good example of the merit of 
such an approach is provided by S. Ben-Ishai, A Team Production Theory of 
Canadian Corporate Law, (2006) 44 ALBERTA LAW REVIEW 2, preprint 
available at http://www.comparativeresearch.net/main.php?page=papers.php. 
4  Peer Zumbansen, Spaces and Places: A Systems Theory Approach to Regulatory 
Competition in European Company Law, 12 EUR. L. J. 534 (2006) 
5  Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing 
Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 97 (2002) 
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involves modes of public and private ordering with direct and indirect 
regulatory effects.6 For their valuable contribution to the study of 
“comparative corporate governance”,7 the editors deserve applause. 
 
 
II. 
 
What was Enron? Emerging in the 1990s as an overwhelmingly successful 
corporate actor with a keen sense for the transforming political climate, 
marked by a forceful embrace of large-scale deregulation and privatization 
policies, Enron emerged as the arguably smoothest player in a fast 
unfolding energy trading game – before in late 2001, its name quickly 
became a worldwide-known formula for a plethora of regulatory failings, 
personal misconduct and largest-scale financial and existential losses.8 
Enron’s fall from the global capital market’s grace was brought about by 
its management’s outrageous collaboration in deducing corporate assets 
and misstating the company’s financial status. Enron’s dealings, which led 
to wide-reaching criminal persecution, have been among the prime 
homework-providers for corporate law regulators in just about every 
jurisdiction worldwide.9  
 
Within the last few years, the US Congress’ Sarbanes-Oxley (aka SOX) 
legislation of 2002 would become a short formula for similar-minded 
corporate governance law reform worldwide.10 Today, where SOX is 
attracting criticism for allegedly unreasonably raising compliance costs,11 
                                                 
6  This is elaborated in GRALF-PETER CALLIESS/PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH 
CONSENSUS AND RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW 
(forthcoming). 
7  Mark J. Roe, Comparative corporate governance, in: THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 339 (Newman Ed. 1998). 
8  William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. 
REV. 1275 (2002), 1278. 
9  D. Millon, Who "Caused" the Enron Debacle?, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 309 
(2003); D. Millon, Enron and the Dark Side of Worker Ownership, 1 SEATTLE J 
SOC. JUST. 113 (2002) 
10  JILL SOLOMON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY, 2nd ed. 
(2007) 
11  J. Shinal, Is it Time to Relax the Sarbanes Oxley Act? (26 May 2006) Market 
Watch. 
  
4                                          CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES       [VOL. 03 NO. 06 
 
the Act’s section 404 and other countries’ likeminded regulations12 are 
under heightened scrutiny. Section 404 requires the creation of extensive 
policies and controls within public companies to secure, document, 
process, and verify material information dealing with financial results. 
Essentially, it requires that each annual report filed with the SEC – 
overseeing ‘reporting companies’ with at least 300 shareholders and 
minimum assets of US$500 million – contain an internal control report. 
That report must detail management’s responsibility for establishing and 
implementing adequate procedures for financial reporting, including an 
assessment of internal control structures and procedures and disclosing 
eventually adopted codes of ethics. One of the clearest signs of the Act’s 
retaliatory nature is its requirement that the company’s Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) and Chief Financial Officer (CFO) personally certify the 
report’s accuracy. 
 
Interestingly enough, the Act’s emphasis on individual, personal 
misconduct is not precisely what SOX’s critics seek. Instead, it is the 
law’s creation of a compliance regime, which is altogether being perceived 
as burdensome, counterproductive and ineffective. To be sure, the degree 
to which the issue of personal guilt of CEOs and CFOs remains within the 
purview of ongoing corporate law reform, both professionally and in 
popular discourse, is reflected for example in the attention given to aspects 
of management remuneration, which alone has prompted a long 
worldwide debate.13 And it is here where the contributions in Armour’s 
and McCahery’s volume constitute a much-needed and welcome advance 
in the current debates over corporate governance. The authors of their 
collection provide excellent insights into the much more complex 
regulatory framework surrounding corporate governance. 
 
III. 
 
The contributions to the volume are divided into four sections. They are 
preceded by an introduction essay by the two editors, who assume the ever 
                                                 
12  For Canada, see e.g., T. Gray, Canadian Response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002: New Directions in Corporate Governance, (4 October 2005), available at: 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb0537-e.pdf  
13  Hereto, see the critical remarks by William W. Bratton, The Academic 
Tournament over Executive Compensation, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1557 (2005) 
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more rarely assumed task of actually ‘editing’ the work of their 
contributors. Armour and McCahery provide a roadmap through the 
volume by engaging with each of the chapters and by placing them in the 
context of the larger debates to which they contribute. This will 
particularly help those readers who have either no prior firmer knowledge 
of the Enron debacle nor of the various regulatory responses, and who are 
particularly interested in corporate law reform from a distinctly 
comparative perspective. Given the predominantly Anglo-Saxon focus of 
much of the volume, it succeeds in mapping and further facilitating a 
dialogue, a dialogue no longer merely between scholars of different 
jurisdictions, but moreover between differently conceived and evolved 
regulatory cultures. 
 
The first of the four sections of the book, “Stock Markets and 
Information”, contains two longer articles by Ronald Gilson and Reinier 
Kraakman, and Don Langevoort respectively, who inquire into the 
emergence and valiance of traditional evaluatory instruments to measure a 
firm’s worth as the decisive signal to stock market investors. In light of the 
inevitable rise of stock market capitalism in the US and the UK, and the 
pressure on stakeholder capitalist regimes such as France, Germany and 
Japan,14 the editors are correct in asking how Enron could so long hide its 
destructive dealings before the capital market’s “eye that sees all”. Inviting 
two of the field’s leading scholars to build on their previous work on the 
role of stock market institutions in soliciting, interpreting and 
disseminating information and to pursue this focus within the 
contemporary capital market environment provides for an intriguing 
overture to the book’s inquiry. It is particularly helpful because Gilson’s 
and Kraakman’s article provides for a sober view on how much 
irrationality still exists in our attempts to read the stocks. The section’s 
second article by Langevoort on its face adds to this picture of remaining 
uncertainty and irrationality even where in fact more information had been 
available to investors. Both sections put in context some of the basis of the 
regulatory retaliation after Enron that emphasized the need for better 
disclosure. 
                                                 
14  See Ronald Dore/William Lazonick/Mary O'Sullivan, Varieties of Capitalism in 
the Twentieth Century, 15 OXFORD REVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICY (Oxford Rev. 
Econ. Pol'y) 102 (1999). 
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The second section is dedicated to the exploration of “Corporate Scandals 
in Historical and Comparative Context” and collects papers on the US 
(David Skeel Jr.), the UK (Simon Deakin and Suzanne Konzelmann) and 
Italy (Guido Ferrarini and Paolo Giudici). These are preceded by a 
summarizing evaluation of “Why the US and Europe Differ” (John 
Coffee). This section’s contributions underscore the importance of seeing 
beyond the demands of the day when responding to crisis.  
 
In tracing the different aspects of various corporate scandals in the 
investigated countries’ history, the authors in this section illuminate key 
connections of the way in which scandals were and are being perceived 
and responded to. They succeed in raising some doubt as to the adequacy 
of some of the regulatory responses.  
 
This discussion becomes particularly interesting, when the responses are 
being reviewed in the context of the specific corporate governance regime 
in which they unfolded. It is here, then, where the differences between a 
shareholder and stakeholder oriented corporate governance regime are 
apparently put to the test. If scandals do indeed take place in either regime, 
the analysis of their scope and the regulatory response speaks well beyond 
the concrete scandal to the nature of the respective corporate governance 
regime. The authors’ inquiry into the reasons why – to take the case of 
Italy for example, where rules even more stringent than SOX failed to 
prevent fraud or why – measures to prevent corporate fraud often fail, 
ultimately reveals the great need for deeper comparative work.  
 
The chapters provide a powerful illustration of why discussions over 
convergence versus divergence of corporate governance regimes will 
eventually fail in the face of the particular dynamics of regulatory change 
that we can observe in the various jurisdictions. While a first-cut 
distinction between “outsider” and “insider” corporate governance regimes 
is helpful in identifying some of the base variances in regulatory design,15 
we need to direct our attention to the environment in which corporate law 
regulation is unfolding. This environment involves a transnational 
proliferation of norm authors and norm setting sites, changing political 
                                                 
15  Klaus J. Hopt, Common Principles of Corporate Governance in Europe?, in: 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES. CONVERGENCE AND DIVERSITY 175 
(McCahery/Moerland/Raaijmakers/Renneborg Ed. 2002), 175. 
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coalitions16 and an intricate mix of regulatory approaches.17 It is from such 
a reformed investigative agenda, that we can hope to find more helpful 
answers to the conundra of Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat, and other 
scandals. 
 
The third section, entitled “Evaluating Regulatory Responses: The US and 
UK”, brings together papers by such luminaries as Lucian Bebchuk and 
Bill Bratton, among others. It focuses on the SOX, particularly its 
regulatory aspirations as well as its blind spots and omissions. Given its 
thematic orientation, this section could likely be taken as the shortest-
living with regard to its concrete engagement with specific elements of an 
evolving regulatory regime. Yet, the individual papers reach beyond their 
contemporary confines by either building on existing or unfolding a 
further-looking research agenda and discussion. To take an example, 
Lucian Bebchuk’s paper forms part of his recent proposals to strengthen 
shareholder rights within the corporation. Likewise, the paper by Bill 
Bratton contributes to an ongoing discussion over the rules versus 
principled-based approach in designing accounting rules.  
 
The final, fourth section of the volume, which takes up more than a third 
of the book’s space, is entitled “Reforming EU Company Law and 
Securities Regulation”. It constitutes a perfect orchestration of the most 
interesting voices in the current discussion in Europe. It is this part of the 
book that arguably carries the greatest weight in deepening the 
transatlantic dialogue over corporate regulation. The papers - authored by 
Paul Davies, Klaus Hopt, John Armour, Gérard Hertig, Joseph McCahery, 
Eilis Ferran and Luca Enriques - bring to the table the leading voices in 
the current European Community (EC) company law reform debate. This, 
at the same time, might be seen as the section’s weaker spot, if at all. What 
                                                 
16  John W. Cioffi, Corporate Governance Reform, Regulatory Politics, and the 
Foundations of Finance Capitalism in the United States and Germany, 7 
GERMAN L. J. 533 (2006); PETER A. GOUREVITCH/JAMES SHINN, POLITICAL 
POWER AND CORPORATE CONTROL. THE NEW GLOBAL POLITICS OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE (2005). 
17  John Armour, Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC Legislation versus 
Regulatory Competition, 55 CURR. LEG. PROBLS. 369 (2005) (in After Enron, at 
497); Simon Deakin, Reflexive Governance and European Company Law, in: 
CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 2007, available at: 
www.comparativeresearch.net; Zumbansen, supra note 4. 
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is shared among these authors and, again this gives testimony to the 
editors’ conscious design of their book and of their commitment to telling 
a coherent story, is a particular perspective on corporate law reform, which 
is ultimately a perspective on the corporation itself.  
 
All authors in this section have in various ways been personally involved 
in advisory or even law proposal commissions within the EC in recent 
years, and are thus the last to be accused of being naïve of the challenges 
of corporate law reform. Yet, their astute understanding of the European 
intricacies of multilevel lawmaking and negotiation18 might also explain 
their reluctance to engage in a more fundamental inquiry into the greater 
political goals of corporate law reform. Such an inquiry would inevitably 
lead them to reconsider the broader role of business corporations in 
society. The book’s editors and their authors19 are well aware of this 
connection, clearly expressed for example by Simon Deakin’s and 
Suzanne Konzelmann’s chapter.20 Yet, their brief presence (the paper is a 
pithy five pages) paradoxically also underlines the absence of another set 
of issues and approaches, which the volume could profitably have alluded 
to and which the editors could have sought to integrate in their collection.  
 
Clive Schmitthoff, writing in 1973, provided a succinct and highly 
sensitive account of the challenges facing corporate law reform in 
Europe.21 He already then pointed to the particular intricacies arising for 
law reform from a complex political economy of an integrating Europe. 
Europe – like Enron – is an enigma, a conundrum, a formula, which 
always stands for more than a given observer can perceive. If one thing is 
certain about European company law reform, however, it is its 
                                                 
18  For an illustration, see only the chapter by Hertig and McCahery on Company 
and Takeover Law Reforms in Europe: Misguided Harmonization Efforts or 
Regulatory Competition (at 545); see also the interesting account by Christian 
Kirchner/Richard W. Painter, Takeover Defenses under Delaware Law, the 
Proposed Thirteenth EU Directive and the New German Takeover Law: 
Comparison and Recommendations for Reform, 50 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 451 (2002). 
19  See only the contribution in this volume by K.J. Hopt, Modern Company and 
Capital Market Problems: Improving European Corporate Governance After 
Enron (at 455). 
20  Corporate Governance after Enron: An Age of Enlightenment (at 155).  
21  Clive Schmitthoff, The Future of the European Company Law Scene, in: THE 
HARMONISATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW 3 (Schmitthoff Ed. 1973). 
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inseparability from the greater process of European Integration and how 
Europe relates to its global environment.22 The coming years will show to 
which degree the participants in the debate are able to reflect on the 
correlation between policy choices and theoretical models to explain the 
business corporation. It is certain, and the reviewed book is a much needed 
illustration of this insight, that Europe is still in evolution and that the 
study of corporate law reform is taking place in a vibrant, 24-7 open 
conceptual and experimental laboratory.   
 
________________ 
 
                                                 
22  Jeffrey N. Gordon, An International Relations Perspective on the Convergence 
of Corporate Governance: German Shareholder Capitalism and the European 
Union, 1990-2000, 108 ARBEITSPAPIERE DES INSTITUTS FÜR BANKRECHT DER 
JOHANN WOLFGANG GOETHE-UNIVERSITÄT 1 (2003), available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=374620  
